Abstract-Spent fuel storage pools in most countries are rapidly approaching their design limits with the discharge of over 10,000 metric tons of heavy metal from global reactors. Countries like UK, France or Japan have adopted a closed fuel cycle by reprocessing spent fuel and recycling MOX fuel while many other countries opted for above ground interim dry storage for their spent fuel management strategy. Some countries like Finland and Sweden are already well on the way to setting up a conditioning plant and a deep geological repository for spent fuel. For all these situations, shipments of spent fuel are needed and the number of these shipments is expected to increase significantly.
I. INTRODUCTION
he objective of shipper/receiver difference (SRD) measurements is to ensure that the nuclear material that leaves a shipping facility remains identical without any diversion or modification when it arrives at the receiving facility. SRD of nuclear material is typically measured at the receiving facility as soon as the nuclear material has arrived at the receiving facility. When the nuclear material is spent fuel, the SRD measurement is extremely difficult or impossible as there is no practical instrument that confirms the shipper information. In practice for the case of reprocessing plants, SRD measurements have to wait until head end processes, which include chopping, shearing of spent fuel into small pieces for dissolution in nitric acid. are completed on the spent fuel assembly and the spent fuel is transferred to the input accountability tank. SRD is defined by IAEA as the difference between the quantity of nuclear material in a batch as stated by the shipping material balance area and as measured at the receiving material balance area.
As the shipper's values are based on the calculated fissile contents of spent-fuel assemblies at the reactor, whereas receiver's values are based on measurements at the input accountability tank that are adjusted for losses in hulls, there exists uncertainty or discrepancy of the reactor operator calculations of plutonium content up to 5-10 percent. This creates a situation that SRD can be up to 5-10% even if no material has been lost or diverted. Verification of shipper's data such as contents of plutonium or uranium in a spent fuel assembly is practically impossible as the verification requires verification of fuel manufacturer's data, the knowledge of the detailed reactor power operating history as well as the shipper's isotopic generation and depletion calculation methods. Even if the entire shipper's data are trustworthy, the discrepancy between declared values and measured values has to be reconciled without compromising safeguards principles. Improvement of the measurement techniques alone at the accountability tank does not necessarily solve this fundamental problem as the computer calculations have to be perfect, something that is difficult to achieve.
One manifestation of this situation is that the discrepancy of the input material in the accountancy tank at THORP of BNFL was only found after 8 months of steady loss of material through a leak in the accountancy tank, which amounted to 20 tonnes of uranium and 200 kilograms of plutonium. Interestingly the leak was found because of calculated T discrepancies in the nuclear material balance that had been performed for safeguards purposes in April, 2005 [1] [2] . This accident demonstrates that diversion can go unnoticed if diversion of fuel pins from spent fuel assemblies ranging between 10 and 20% with some adjustment on the shipper's values or even potentially without any adjustment on the shipper's values if the degree of diversion is somewhere below 5%. The diversion can happen anytime during the lifetime of spent fuel even during reloading prior to their arrival at the reprocessing plant. In such a scenario, these spent fuel assemblies will be reprocessed without raising any suspicion of material diversion.
The issue of SRD is not just limited to reprocessing plants. In fact, recipient facilities that receive spent fuel are all subject to the issue of SRD determination. Examples of this would include conditioning plants that receive spent fuel for geological repositories, pyroprocessing facilities, or dry storages. Often the spent fuels are accepted into these facilities without thorough evaluation of partial defect testing, a serious safeguards and security issue that need to be addressed.
In this paper we describe a new method that addresses the issue of SRD determination with the implementation of an instrument under development, Partial Defect Tester (PDET), which can detect pin diversion from PWR spent fuel assemblies in an in-situ or isolated condition. The PDET uses multiple tiny neutron and gamma detectors in a form of cluster and highly precise, gravity-driven system to obtain simultaneously underwater radiation measurements inside guide tubes of a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) spent fuel assembly. The information gathered is used to detect pin diversion as well as to confirm consistency of the facility provided data.
II. METHODS

A. Partial Defect Verification by PDET
Every PWR fuel assembly has as a design feature a set of guide tubes where a control rod assembly can be inserted (see Fig. 1.) . The control rod assembly is used to control neutron flux during reactor operation. In the discharged spent fuel assembly (SFA), the guide tubes are filled with water when stored in the spent fuel pool. The concept of partial defect verification is to use the gamma and neutron flux information inside these guide tube holes to develop signature profiles that are invariant in intact SFAs.
The gamma and neutron signals are obtained by inserting tiny neutron and gamma detectors into the guide tubes of a SFA. The guide tubes form a quadrant symmetric pattern in the various PWR fuel product lines and the neutron and gamma signals from these various locations are processed to obtain a unique signature for an undisturbed fuel assembly, defined as the base signature. The base signatures can be formed from gamma signals, neutron signals or gamma to neutron ratio. The base gamma signature is the arrangement of the gamma signals at each of the guide tube locations normalized to the maximum among them in a particular pattern. For example, for a 14x14 PWR SFA, there are 16 guide tubes, and thus 16 measurement positions or 16 gamma data points. A symmetric pattern or base signature is obtained when gamma signals are plotted in a systematic manner starting with the guide tube location closest to the center and moving in a counter-clockwise manner for each cluster of 4 guide tubes (e.g. c, d, a, b, etc.) Figure 2 shows the alphabetic labels 'a' through 'p' for the sixteen locations. The base signatures of neutron and ratio of gamma to neutron are obtained in a similar manner. Figure 3 shows a typical base signature for the ratio when the SFA has no missing fuel pins. In the case of diversion of nuclear fuel pins, one or more of the base signatures gets distorted and the amount of distortion depends on the degree of diversion. Previous papers detailed the development of this unique signature that will be noticeably perturbed if some of the fuel pins are replaced with dummy pins both in isolated SFAs as well as SFAs in an in-situ condition in the storage racks in symmetric or random removal patterns [3] [4] [5] [6] . The methodology was validated with measurements in SFAs with excellent agreement between the experimental and simulated data. Thus a visual inspection of the signature can identify partial defects, making the verification method easy to interpret without requiring operator declared data or fuel movement [7] . B. Shipper/Receiver Verification Methodology SRD verification methodology is based upon using thermal neutron and gamma dose data generated by PDET measurements. We started with a hypothesis that there is a unique relationship between burnup and neutron count similar to the relationship between burnup and neutron count generated by FDET [8] as well as potentially a unique relationship between total gamma dose and burnup.
In order to explore those relationships, a set of simulations was performed using a 14x14 Westinghouse PWR spent fuel assembly to obtain the gamma and neutron signals at the sixteen guide tube locations. These sixteen guide tubes represent locations where measurements can be made by inserting tiny gamma and neutron detectors. Each simulation in the set was performed by using uniform burnups ranging from 15-45 GWd/t, an initial enrichment of 3.8 w% 235 U, and a ten year cooling time. In addition two more simulations were performed for assemblies with varying intra-assembly burnups in the range of 20-40 GWd/t. These two PWR assemblies were actual discharged PWR assemblies from a commercial nuclear power plant. The neutron and gamma source strengths for the assembly as well as isotopics at each burnup level were obtained using the burnup and decay code, ORIGEN-ARP [9] . The Monte Carlo radiation transport code, MCNP [10] , was used to obtain the gamma and neutron signals at the guide tube locations.
The average gamma signal based on the sixteen locations was plotted against the burnup and linearly fitted to obtain an expression relating gamma signal and burnup. In addition, the average gamma signal of the four guide tube locations closest to the center of the assembly was also plotted against burnup.
The gamma dose relationship with burnup can be expressed as ( ) = * ( ) + where G is gamma dose which is Cs137 cooling time corrected, bu is fuel burnup, a and b are constants. It is assumed that spent fuel assemblies are at least several years old such that gamma dose is principally Cs137 dominated. The same linear relationship holds true when the average data at four locations were used. These four locations will be minimally impacted by gammas coming in from neighboring assemblies in an in-situ condition where the test assembly would be surrounded by other in the storage pool. They would thus represent a more realistic basis for confirming the operator declared burnup as well as the fact that the gamma signals at these central locations would represent the average burnup of the assembly in cases where there is an intraassembly burnup gradient. Note the correlation between total gamma dose and burnup was very linear, although total gamma dose was used for gamma signal, whether the average gamma dose was used based on sixteen guide tube locations or four guide tube locations. This is an extraordinary finding that renders SRD verification very practical and in-situ verification possible. Similar to gamma data generation, simulated thermal neutron data were also generated at the guide tube locations producing two curves shown in Figs 6 and 7. The neutron signals exhibited a strong power function of burnup (~4.3) similar to a power function generated by FDET [8] . Note that the power function for neutrons is sensitive to the initial enrichment of the fuel.
The neutron count relationship with burnup can be expressed as ( ) = * ( ) where N is neutron count that is Cm244 cooling time corrected, bu is fuel burnup, c and d are constants.
Having established two relationships or "calibration curves" between burnup and gamma dose, and between burnup and neutron data, the curves can be used to confirm facility operator declared cooling time and burnup values. An IAEA inspector can easily choose a data collection method depending upon facility situations. If spent fuel assemblies can be lifted and isolated for measurements, both neutron and gamma data are used for partial defect testing, and then confirmation for cooling time and burnup information using both "calibration curves. It is impossible for an operator to satisfy both calibration curves in the case of trying to cheat by changing both cooling time and burnup data. Isolated measurements of spent fuel are the only way to ensure nondiversion of spent fuel pins and to confirm both cooling time and burnup. If only in-situ measurements are possible, partial defect testing is still performed first, but cooling time and burnup information are confirmed only by the calibration curve that uses gamma information. However, there is still a potential to satisfy the calibration curve by simultaneously changing burnup and cooling time data. 
III. EXPERIMENTS
In order to validate the concept of the SRD verification methodology, experiments were carried out to obtain gamma signals inside guide tubes of PWR spent fuel assemblies which were being stored at a commercial spent fuel pool at a reactor site. Note that measurement data were obtained in-situ without moving any spent fuel assemblies individually at each guide tube position at the depth of 1.25 meter below the top nozzle. Table 1 shows the fuel information of the of the six Westinghouse type PWR fuel assemblies used for measurements.
In-house developed underwater neutron measurement system was used to measure neutron signals inside guide tube holes in PWR spent fuel assemblies. A Centronic fission chamber was used for thermal neutron measurements in a waterproof housing, and IAEA standard electronics and software, i.e., Mini Multi-Channel Analyzer and WinMCS software, for data acquisition. For gamma measurements, a special type of ion chamber was fabricated by Technical Associates. The ion chamber was waterproof and could be directly inserted into guide tubes. Whereas a computer and data acquisition software were needed for thermal neutron measurements, the gamma radiation dose could be directly read from a dose reader in a digital format. Typically it took less than a few minutes for insertion of neutron detector, and additional 900 seconds for a single position measurement in MCS mode. Table II shows the measurement data at four guide tube locations of the spent fuel assemblies, average gamma dose, and Cs137 corrected gamma dose. Variation in the four data of an assembly indicates the degree of burn-ups within an assembly.
Measured gamma dose data and Cs137 cooling time corrected data are plotted in Fig. 8 as a function of burnup. Cs137 cooling time corrected plot shows a good linearity demonstrating that confirmation of the operator declared data of burnup and cooling time can be achieved by creating and using a "calibration curve". Spent fuel assemblies with erroneous data will deviate from this "calibration curve". The reason for linearity of the raw data is due to relatively close discharge date compared to the long half life of Cs137.
In order to look at the simulated and measured data on a same plot, the simulated data were normalized to the measured data by minimizing the square error of the estimate, resulting in the normalization factor, E Figures 9 shows the simulated and measured data together with the fitted equation for the measured data for the cases of the average simulated gamma signal based on the average simulated gamma signal at the four guide tube locations closest to the center of the assembly.
One can observe that the "calibration curve", Cs137 corrected plot, is relatively insensitive to initial enrichment variation of the fuel. This feature is valuable in actual field verification in particular when only a small number of measurements is to be performed due to limited time available for measurements at a facility.
Although neutron data are not useful in the analysis as measurements were done in-situ, neutron data are, in general, much more sensitive to initial fuel enrichment. For this reason, the spent fuel assemblies with the same initial enrichment need to be grouped together for their analysis.
In an actual verification with the use of PDET, an inspector would choose a method of measurements either in-situ or in an isolated measurement condition. Initially the measured data are used for partial defect verification of the spent fuel assembly. Subsequently, all measured data are plotted as a function of burnup as shown in Fig. 8 or Fig. 9 to confirm cooling time and burnup of every spent fuel assembly. An effective methodology has been developed to confirm SRD verification utilizing thermal neutron and gamma dose information collected at guide tube locations of a PWR spent fuel assembly. The data can be generated easily by PDET. The method can be applicable either in an isolated spent fuel measurement condition or in-situ condition. The PDET armed with this new cooling time and burnup verification method can be a powerful and yet a practical tool to ensure integrity of spent fuel that it encounters. 
